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The development of a border between the British and Dutch colonial regimes in Southeast Asia was inti-
mately linked with smuggling across their frontier. While 
advances in technology and organisation enhanced Europe-
an abilities to create and maintain borders during the period 
1865-1915, western, and particularly Dutch fears of the ‘wild 
space’ of frontier areas never really waned over the course 
of this period. 
Smuggling in its many manifestations (of drugs, arms, peo-
ple, and currency, for example) had much to do with this 
paradoxical dynamic. Though these states waged fairly suc-
cessful wars against certain ‘secret trades’ (such as counterfeit 
currency), other goods such as narcotics were never control-
led during these 50 years. Other contraband commodities 
including human beings, in the form of prostitutes, coolies, 
and slaves, metamorphosed over time and more or less went 
underground. The Anglo/Dutch border, created and strength-
ened by modernising colonial states, was rife with smuggling; 
stated another way, boundary-production and boundary-trans-
gression were two sides of the same coin.
Evidence in fragments
The story of smuggling across the sensitive and evolving 
Anglo-Dutch border in Southeast Asia is complex, and avail-
able information is fragmentary at best. Grand economic and 
political narratives do not tell the full story. To get an idea 
of how borders and smuggling actually interacted on the 
ground, we need to look at individual people and specific plac-
es: testimonials of Chinese woodcutters who were trafficked 
to coastal Sumatra; witness statements of men whose ships 
were pirated off the shore of Aceh; data on morphine seizures 
in Penang in 1906; the waters around the island of Bangka, 
which reveal evolving imperial hydrographical abilities at the 
turn of the century. While the physical locus of smuggling 
along the Anglo/Dutch boundary was local, radials of this 
commerce penetrated to far away places – Java and Timor, and 
even China, Arabia and Japan. The Anglo-Dutch frontier in 
colonial Southeast Asia was a swirling maelstrom of people, 
landscapes and connections that bound the region into a new 
grid, and maintained links outside of it at the same time.
The entirety of this illicit commerce might be called ‘under-
trading’: the passage of goods underneath – or at the legal and 
geographic interstices of – the majority of items traded in the 
area. Undertrading had a phased existence, with certain prod-
ucts and ports passing in and out of the ‘undertrade’ category. 
Items in these waters were not designated as contraband sim-
ply on ontological grounds. Rather, historical moments dic-
tated to colonial governments whether it was in their interest 
to designate products as illegal. Thus guns, unfarmed opium 
and human beings (such as prostitutes and slaves) were often 
classified as contraband; other commodities, including pep-
per, porcelain, and even bulk shipments of rice, were only 
sometimes listed so. Specific ports could likewise be declared 
open to trade or strictly off-limits. Such decisions encouraged 
a brisk flow of officially ‘illicit’ goods – either in newly illegal 
items or to newly illegal places.
Spaces of dissent
Some spaces were judged to be better than others for smug-
gling, giving rise to a geography of contrabanding. Histori-
cally, undertrading has flourished in borderlands and periph-
eries; at natural choke points, such as mountain passes and 
narrow waterways; and in urban confusion, where the state 
has difficulty seeing through the frenzy of activity. Singapore 
– situated along the narrow waterway of the Straits and being 
a maritime border town – was a perfect focal point for smug-
gling. The city was also a crucial haven for smugglers because 
of its size and chaotic complexity. Here the vision and reach 
of the state, supposedly at its strongest at the seat of regional 
imperial power, was limited. There were never enough coast 
guard cutters and police; there were always too many sam-
pans and dark alleys. When the coercive power of government 
caught up with local smugglers, the latter resisted by using 
small, fast sailing craft, false shipping papers, hidden cargo 
spaces and loopholes in the law.
Smuggling also took place in the networks of corruption and 
private interest that riddled the state in the form of its own 
civil servants. The collaboration of civil servants was often 
crucial to the success of contrabanding as they could ensure 
that the gaze of the state turned elsewhere at the appropriate 
time. This happened in both the British and Dutch spheres in 
19th century Southeast Asia. Yet it is difficult to find records 
of these liaisons, as both colonial powers had much invested 
in their regimes’ supposed moral superiority, at least in the 
face of their subject populations. Nevertheless, corruption on 
the part of civil servants was an important part of the history 
of contrabanding.
Who were the smugglers?
Who smuggled commodities in colonial Southeast Asia? It 
would not be an exaggeration to answer ‘just about everyone’: 
Chinese populations of various sub-groupings and linguis-
tic affiliations, ‘Malays’, Bugis, Dayaks, Japanese, ‘Sea Gyp-
sies’ and Europeans all took their turn. Re-distributing com-
modities to subordinates to ensure vassalage was common 
throughout the region. The stakes for trading or smuggling 
successfully were high: ensuring the flow of goods could mean 
the difference between maintaining one’s power or losing it 
to rivals. Many could participate as the overhead needed for 
smuggling was often very low – a boat, some provisions, and 
local knowledge of tides, sandbars, and winds. With the impo-
sition of powerful European states in the late 19th century, 
many local people did indeed try to make money in this way.
Such forms of state-designated criminality and resistance 
against ruling regimes have taken on many guises in human 
history. If James Scott is right in that the peasantry had eve-
ryday ways to resist state and elite exactions, how much more 
was this the case for merchants and long-distance traders? 
Possessing capital and distant contacts which peasants lacked 
– and a mobility that was part and parcel of their occupation 
– merchants (and the corrupt officials who were very often 
their allies) found many ways to resist the tightening stric-
tures of government, especially by smuggling. Some traders 
were merely continuing age-old commodity lines that only 
now were designated as contrabanding by governments. Oth-
ers saw the new imposition of borders and rigidified controls 
as an opportunity to make money. Many passed from being 
colonial compradors into outlaws, though some of the smart-
est seem to have been able to occupy both niches at once. <
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Smuggling and states along 
a Southeast Asian frontier
What is the nature of commodities in transit as they move across unstable spaces like 
international boundaries? How do time, geography, and culture influence whether or not goods 
are considered to be contraband? Who gets involved in smuggling, and why? Is involvement 
influenced by ethnicity, language, and class? How do states ‘see’ – especially along their frontiers? 
And what strategies do smugglers use to outwit the state’s normally superior resources?
